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It is a great pleasure for me to be here with you today. In the world of refugees and migration, Canada sets an important example globally in terms of its generosity 
towards the other, its multicultural, multi-ethnic and multi-
religious society, its long-standing and rich tradition of asy-
lum as well as its global refugee policies. Th is tradition is 
exemplifi ed not least in its annual resettlement programme 
and Canada’s role as a major donor country to UNHCR. Th e 
High Commissioner, and UNHCR as an institution, deeply 
value and appreciate the contributions that the people of 
Canada, its lively civil society and successive governments 
have made over time to the protection of refugees and the 
internally displaced.
In this address I would like to share with you a number 
of refl ections on the changing dynamics of displacement 
and possible ways forward—the challenging theme of this 
Conference.
But before doing so, I think it is important to set out 
briefl y the factual background against which this discus-
sion takes place.
At the end of 2010, there were roughly 16 million refu-
gees and asylum-seekers, including 5 million Palestinian 
refugees. We have detailed population data on 3.5 million 
stateless around the world but know the overall population 
is several times larger which is why we continue to map 
stateless populations. Refugee voluntary repatriation move-
ments in 2010 were the lowest in 20 years. Only 200,000 
refugees chose to return home, against an annual average of 
over a million in the last two decades. Th e initial estimate 
for 2011 is slightly better, at some 530,000 returns. Some 
26.4 million people were internally displaced, with 3.5 mil-
lion people newly displaced during 2011. Th is is a modest 
decline in their number, down from 27.5 million in 2010.1 
Last year also saw the emergence of several new situations 
of internal displacement. In Côte d’Ivoire, violence follow-
ing the November 2010 presidential elections forced an esti-
mated half a million people to fl ee their homes. In Somalia, 
the worst drought in decades aggravated the country’s 
chronic instability and led to one of the worst humanitarian 
emergencies of 2011. In Mali, the number of those displaced 
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internally has reached almost 150,000 and, according to 
the Syrian Red Crescent, some 400 to 500 thousand are dis-
placed inside Syria.
In the industrialized world, the year 2011 also witnessed 
a 20 per cent increase in new asylum applications compared 
to 2010. However, the increases were not evenly distributed 
and were evident mainly in the eight Southern European 
countries, North America as well as Japan and South Korea. 
For their part, the Nordic countries as well as Australia wit-
nessed a decrease. Th e USA was the largest single recipient 
of new asylum applications among industrialized countries, 
followed by France, Germany, Italy and Sweden. UNHCR 
conducted refugee status determination in 67 countries, 
including many countries that are party to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, and registered some 80,050 individual applica-
tions in 2011. Th is corresponds to 11 per cent of the global 
total. It is not surprising that the majority of asylum appli-
cations in the industrialized world are lodged by people 
seeking international protection from war-torn countries 
or those emerging from confl ict, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, Syria and Somalia.
Th ese fi gures refl ect the various developments the world 
witnessed last year, such as the paradigm shift  taking place 
in North Africa and the Middle East. Yet the fi gures in the 
industrialized world need to be juxtaposed with the num-
bers in some of the main refugee receiving countries in the 
developing world, notably Kenya, Ethiopia but also Liberia, 
Niger and other West African countries, plus Mauritania, 
owing to last year’s crises in Somalia, Côte d’Ivoire, and 
this year’s events in Mali, respectively. At the peak of the 
Somalia crisis last year, for example, several thousand 
Somalis fl ed to Kenya and Ethiopia daily. Within a couple 
of weeks, Mauritania and Niger received some 80,000 refu-
gees from Mali this year, which roughly represents the 20 
per cent increase in asylum applications in the industrial-
ized world last year. Tunisia hosted over 100,000 refugees 
from Libya alone in 2011, despite its own diffi  culties and 
political transition. Another interesting phenomenon is 
the increasing fl ows to middle income countries, such as 
Th ailand, Malaysia, Turkey, South Africa and Ecuador.2 We 
have also been encouraged by discussions with a range of 
states, including Australia, Belgium, Brazil and the UK to 
establish statelessness determination procedures to address 
the situation of people who otherwise end up in a protection 
void.
To get a full picture, this statistical overview needs to 
be seen in the broader context of confl ict, migration and 
related developments which are increasingly intermingled 
with forced displacement issues. Compared to the estimated 
7 billion world population [out of whom some 1 billion go 
hungry although this is not necessarily linked to movement], 
the estimated global migration fi gure for 2010 of approxi-
mately 214 million people3 is surprising in that one would, 
I guess, have assumed a much larger portion of the world 
population would be on the move. Looking at the fi gure of 
international migrants from a comparative perspective, it 
has increased by some 59 million people over the last twenty 
years,4 suggesting higher mobility, primarily for labour rea-
sons. And although violent confl ict has declined in the past 
two decades, one and a half billion people still live in fragile 
or confl ict-aff ected countries. Another important trend that 
I would like to fl ag at the outset is the increase in natural 
disasters within the last two decades. While in 1990 there 
were approximately 296 natural disasters recorded, this 
jumped to 428 in 2010, aff ecting an estimated 257 million 
people,5 including 42 million displaced in 2010 purely as a 
result of sudden onset natural disasters.6
It is against this backdrop that I would like to explore 
with you three inter-related themes that I hope can be 
developed further during this Conference.
Asylum
Th e fi rst theme has to do with the atmosphere around refu-
gee protection today, with asylum space and how to enlarge 
it. Increasingly we hear about “the Th irties” as an apt 
description of today’s ills. I think it was IMF Head Christine 
Lagarde who evoked it a couple of months ago when talk-
ing about the world’s fi nancial crisis. While we need to treat 
historical comparisons with caution for obvious reasons, 
they nonetheless evoke an atmosphere, real or perceived, 
which resonates in today’s world. Th is sort of déjà vu has 
a lot to do with the uncertainties of the economic [and 
social] crisis, the high unemployment rates in many parts 
of the world, the stark and growing inequalities within and 
between societies, and the seemingly intractable challenges 
of this century which seem unparalleled in complexity and 
magnitude, such as environmental degradation, the eff ects 
of climate change, population growth or the proliferation 
of weapons of all types. While history does not repeat itself, 
we can draw lessons from the past to master the present and 
the future.
Th e “Th irties” has particular resonance in the refugee 
and statelessness domain, remembering how the sentiments 
prevailing in that decade made people stateless and both 
created refugees and denied them safety in some instances. 
Inequality, high unemployment and a sense of loss of con-
trol are a dangerous mix. Th ey seem to bring out the shadow 
side of our human nature, in dealings between individuals 
and in politics. Inward-looking, protectionist and exclu-
sionary tendencies are oft en the result, not just in the eco-
nomic realm, leading to the marginalization of groups, the 
scapegoating of the other [and in particular what appears 
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alien to us in the other] and in the case of refugees or state-
less people [and migrants more generally] their stigmatiza-
tion as those who cheat and “abuse” the system, or worse 
still, are described as criminals. Th ose on the margins of 
a society, including refugees, asylum-seekers and the state-
less, are easy prey for the gutter press and populist polit-
icians who are eager to play with fi re. Th is phenomenon has 
already emerged in some countries where the public debate 
on asylum and migration policies has become so toxic as 
to preclude any reasonable or clear-headed dialogue. Could 
this be possible without the indiff erence of the majorities to 
the concerns and situation of the minorities?
As Tony Judt remarked before his untimely death in 
August 2010, “what we know of World War II—or the former 
Yugoslavia—illustrates the ease with which any society can 
descend into Hobbesian nightmares of unrestrained atrocity 
and violence. If we are going to build a better future, it must 
begin with a deeper appreciation of the ease with which even 
solidly-grounded liberal democracies can founder.”7 He then 
concludes by saying that “much of what is amiss in our world 
can best be captured in the language of classical political 
thought: we are intuitively familiar with issues of injustice, 
unfairness, inequality and immorality—we have just forgot-
ten how to talk about them.”8
We should not be drawn into a fatalistic mindset by the 
comparison with the past [implied in the “Th irties”]. Th e 
fact that parallels are being drawn with that critical point 
in time does not, of course, mean that there is any terrible 
or inevitable catastrophe ahead of us today. Th e course 
that global events will take in the coming decades will, to 
an overwhelming extent, be determined by the actions and 
directions that states—most of which are led by elected pol-
iticians—will take. Th is means that we, as citizens, have 
choices, and responsibilities, that will play a key role in the 
shaping of the future.
It is therefore all the more important to recognize that 
attitudes toward international refugee protection serve as 
a kind of litmus test of the health of our democratic soci-
eties. Th e institution of asylum is itself a refl ection of val-
ues such as justice, fairness and equality—its existence an 
indicator of the importance of these values in society as 
a whole. Off ering sanctuary to those at risk is not just an 
ancient tradition but a legal and indeed a moral necessity. 
It is the safety valve for those who aspire to a better world 
through their political action, for those who are discrimin-
ated against because of their religious beliefs, their gender, 
or who are stigmatized simply as a result of who they are. It 
was as important when Hungarians or Czechs or Poles fl ed 
repressive regimes aft er the Second World War as it is now 
when people—for instance, in North Africa and parts of the 
Middle East—have no choice but to leave their countries 
because of violence, autocratic rulers or severe discrimina-
tion. Th e importance of asylum cannot be separated from 
any democratization process, on the contrary it has oft en 
been a conduit for democracy.
How is the time-honoured institution of asylum faring 
today?
Th e answer is mixed. In 2011 we witnessed the amaz-
ing generosity both of people and of countries. Just to give 
you a few examples, Tunisian families opened their homes 
to accommodate thousands of Libyan refugees. Similarly 
people in Liberia welcomed Ivorian refugees, and Jordanians 
opened their doors to those fl eeing Iraq and Syria. A num-
ber of countries passed decrees or are working on laws to 
put these practices on a more solid legal footing. Grass roots 
organizations in several countries advocated strongly for 
an open door policy towards refugees and for resettlement 
of specifi c groups, to demonstrate international solidarity 
and burden-sharing. And more generally, in the West, the 
granting of asylum has paved the way for the integration for 
tens of thousands of people every year, thus engendering an 
immediate solution—an aspect that is oft en overlooked and 
not suffi  ciently appreciated.
At the same time, we have also seen signs of what is col-
loquially referred to as “asylum fatigue” both in the North 
and the Global South. It is numbers that appear to count. 
Th e success of today’s asylum policies seems to hinge more 
on keeping numbers down and people out [or ensuring the 
perception that these elements are “under control”], rather 
than ensuring access to safety, the management of the asy-
lum systems in a spirit of solidarity, or craft ing solution-
oriented arrangements. Regrettably there is a lot of negative 
discourse in political and public debates around asylum, 
where legitimate concerns about misuse, smuggling and 
traffi  cking trump concerns about saving lives and doing 
the right thing. Eff orts to adapt the institution of asylum 
to respond to these real challenges should not threaten the 
eff ective operation of the entire institution itself. Suffi  ce to 
note the excessive media reporting on the fate of a luxury 
cruise ship run aground in Italy earlier this year or on the 
100th anniversary of the sinking of the Titanic and compare 
this to the lacklustre reporting on last year’s rescue-at-sea 
crisis in the Mediterranean, when more than 1,500 refu-
gees and stranded migrants lost their lives attempting to 
fl ee Libya by boat. In a particularly sobering report on loss 
of life in the Mediterranean, the Council of Europe docu-
mented the collective failure to come to the rescue of those 
fl eeing Libya by boat.9 I wonder whether what played out in 
the Mediterranean last year is not symptomatic of a broader 
crisis of lack of solidarity and indiff erence aff ecting the very 
core of the institution of asylum today.
What can we do about it? Th ere is no easy answer.
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I am convinced that it is important to go back to basics, 
both in legal and moral terms. Asylum requires the right 
to fl ee, granting access to territory, determining claims 
fairly and expeditiously, as well as ensuring fair treatment 
plus paving the way for the resumption of normal lives. It 
requires that refugees should not be forced to turn to smug-
glers, that they should not be mandatorily detained or be 
separated from their families, that border control and inter-
ception measures are mindful of the needs of refugees and 
other groups with specifi c needs, protection and otherwise, 
and that legal intricacies are resolved with due regard for 
the fundamental purpose of the legal regime established 
in their favour. More broadly, but also more basically, it 
requires treating people with humanity and fairness.
By way of example, appropriate measures are indeed 
necessary to combat people smuggling and traffi  cking in 
human beings. But combating such crimes needs to go 
hand-in-hand with proper protection safeguards of the 
sort envisaged by the Palermo Protocols10—safeguards to 
ensure that the victims of such crimes, not least those who 
are asylum-seekers and refugees, are not penalized and 
can gain access to protection, in the many cases where it is 
needed. Mandatory detention regimes for certain categor-
ies of asylum-seekers have not only wrought suff ering and 
long-term psychological harm for the detained, but have 
also provoked a considerable public backlash. UNHCR has 
regularly pointed to the problems associated with diff eren-
tiated treatment of various groups of asylum-seekers and 
refugees, depending on the mode of arrival, to the quality 
of decision-making, as well as to the need for eff ective rem-
edies being made available through an appeal process which 
off ers substantive review both of the facts and the law. Th e 
diff erence in mode of arrival does not necessarily justify 
distinct statuses being accorded to refugees.
A lot more work also needs to be done to explore the 
potential refugees off er to spur development, both in the 
developing world but also in the rapidly aging developed 
world. With so many protracted refugee situations with 
no end in sight and consistently low numbers of voluntary 
returns to countries of origin, this requires a new hard look 
at solutions that combine local opportunities with a develop-
ment perspective and, in addition, look to broader immi-
gration regimes from which refugees might also benefi t. An 
interesting suggestion was, for instance, made how Dadaab 
refugee camp in Kenya could become a force for develop-
ment.11 In line with this thinking, UNHCR has been work-
ing with UNDP on a Transitional Solutions Initiative which 
aims to transform the humanitarian response to protracted 
displacement situations, such as in Sudan, Colombia and 
Nepal, into a development intervention benefi ting entire 
communities.
Another sign of hope was last year’s Ministerial Meeting 
on the occasion of the anniversaries of the refugee and 
statelessness conventions, which sent an important signal 
that there are fundamental human values which must not 
be compromised. Th e fact that over 100 states solemnly 
deposited concrete pledges to address refugee protection 
and statelessness issues will not only improve the fate of 
thousands of people but is in and of itself a clear message. 
It was equally important that last week the Organization 
of Islamic Cooperation held the Ashgabat Conference on 
Refugees in the Muslim World, pointing out the inter-link-
age between Islamic concepts of asylum and their modern 
legal manifestations. Th is coming December the annual 
High Commissioner’s Dialogue on Protection will take the 
form of an inter-faith dialogue on protection, remembering 
the common heritage of traditions of compassion and 
welcoming, but also building new alliances that can help 
address concrete protection issues for displaced and state-
less persons.
We need political and moral leadership, combined with 
individual engagement, to overcome the tendency to exclude 
and look inwards. Strong voices are needed to explain why it 
is in everyone’s interest to protect the disenfranchised and 
promote their potential contribution to the economic and 
social fabric of our societies.
Interdependence
Th e second theme I’d like to explore is the increasing 
interdependence and inter-linkage of the causes of human 
mobility, especially in light of the challenges that I have just 
mentioned. Obviously, our interest at UNHCR is in those 
movements that do not occur as a result of a free choice but 
due to circumstances that are involuntary. Our interest lies 
in the shared protection concerns that such movements 
necessitate, whether or not they are covered by existing nor-
mative and governance frameworks.
Increasingly, we see, for instance, how food insecurity 
or water scarcity [sometimes avoidable through eff ective 
governance], marginalization of vulnerable groups and 
violence become interlinked, as well as how inequality 
exacerbates poverty and could accelerate the spiral of vio-
lence. Diff erent UN and development reports are replete 
with analyses about massive disparities between and 
within regions and countries, about the unequal sharing 
of the benefi ts of globalization, including from a gender 
equality perspective, and about our current volatile eco-
nomic model, which has neglected social justice and the 
impact on the environment.12 By way of examples, the 
Asia Development Bank, in a recent report, has warned 
that Asia’s rapid economic growth may undermine sta-
bility because the gap between the rich and the poor is 
Volume 28 Refuge Number 2
120
widening.13 Th e same can be said with respect to Africa, 
where governments’ ambitious commercialization of agri-
culture and “land grabs” are destroying traditional liveli-
hoods and pushing people off  their lands.14 Food insecur-
ity combines with and magnifi es violence as causes for 
fl ight, as we witnessed last year in Somalia. Another recent 
example is the situation in the Sahel which has been harsh 
for many years, with millions of people suff ering from 
chronic drought, food insecurity, malnutrition and, more 
recently, from violent confl ict. Since the beginning of the 
year, this has led to the internal displacement of just under 
150,000 people in Mali and an estimated 160,000 refugees 
in Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso, Togo and Guinea 
Conakry. Th e displaced are settling in areas parched by 
drought, where local communities are already struggling 
to cope with its consequences. Th e situation in many ways 
exemplifi es the entire spectrum of today’s complex mix of 
challenges ranging from changes in the external environ-
ment, weak governance structures, confl ict and displace-
ment. Th e question arises as to what sort of protection 
needs to be off ered to persons who are forced to move 
because of these “other” causes.
Important causes for forced movements remain indis-
criminate violence and complex confl icts involving multiple 
agents of violence. Civilians will remain the most aff ected 
and it will be progressively diffi  cult for humanitarian 
agencies to operate. Although the number of confl icts has 
decreased in the past ten years, not many situations have 
actually been resolved, as illustrated by the many protracted 
refugee situations around the world. In the meantime there 
is a transformation in the way violence is occurring, with a 
strong correlation between state fragility and violence. In 
many parts of the world, “private actors” of violence are 
gaining ground, many of whom are involved in organized 
crime but do not generally fall within the commonly under-
stood category of non-state actors or de facto authorities: 
gangs, vigilante groups, drug cartels or organisations with 
radical aims. By way of example, in Iraq armed groups seem 
to engage increasingly in organized crimes such as extor-
tions, kidnappings for ransom and robberies to fund their 
activities, resulting in a deadly combination of persecution 
and common crime.15 When a state is weak, there is an 
increase in non-state actors with malefi cent objectives, such 
as in Somalia or in northern Mali. However, state fragility 
is not only prevalent in Somali-type situations, but also in 
diff erent parts of otherwise well-functioning states, includ-
ing middle-income countries. Th e stereotypical categorisa-
tion of “fragile” low-income and “robust” middle-income 
countries to map violence-induced humanitarian crises is 
no longer holding true. Sometimes these actors of violence 
are closely affi  liated with national or local authorities, with 
a marked adverse impact on humanitarian space. UNHCR 
has embarked on a major research project that, we hope, 
will help us to develop international protection guidelines 
concerning persons displaced by indiscriminate violence, 
confl ict and the changing actors of violence.16
Another global issue and multiplier of other causes of 
forced displacement is climate change. Darfur is oft en noted 
as an example of how environmental degradation and com-
petition over scarce resources over decades can combine 
to trigger confl ict-induced displacement. Another case in 
point is the situation in the Horn of Africa, where environ-
mental stress has always been embedded in the region’s 
cycle of confl icts. We have just contributed to a study that 
examined the interface between climate change, vulner-
ability and refugee outfl ows.17 Some of the more interest-
ing fi ndings indicate, for instance, that many of the refugees 
interviewed had perceived discernible shift s in the climate 
in their home countries over the past ten to fi ft een years. 
While they did not refer to the impacts of climate change as 
a direct catalyst for violent confl ict, the scarcity of resour-
ces exacerbated by worsening weather conditions was oft en 
cited as a multiplier or magnifi er of pre-existing confl icts. 
Th ey also mentioned that violent confl icts and state repres-
sion reduced the adaptation capacity of those exposed to 
climate change. Again, this reveals that there is perhaps a 
stronger link between “traditional” refugee law premised 
on a notion of persecution and modern displacement phe-
nomena, such as the consequences of climate change, than 
hitherto understood. Th is is certainly the case where the 
impact of climate change-related processes act as causes of, 
or exacerbate, confl ict, violence, state repression or public 
disorder. Deleterious action or inaction by a government 
to address disaster risk reduction or preparedness or, once 
disaster strikes, to deal with its humanitarian consequences, 
if related to one or more of the Convention grounds, may 
well be considered persecution within the meaning of 
the 1951 Refugee Convention. Th is said, it is equally clear 
that there is a normative gap aff ecting people who may be 
forced to cross an international border owing to the impact 
of rapid-onset meteorological events, possibly linked to 
climate change.18 It is very encouraging that Norway and 
Switzerland, joined by Mexico and Germany, deposited a 
pledge at the Ministerial Meeting last year “to cooperate with 
interested states, UNHCR and other relevant actors with the 
aim of obtaining a better understanding of such cross border 
movements at relevant regional and sub-regional levels, iden-
tifying best practices and developing consensus on how best 
to assist and protect the aff ected people.”
Th us if we look at today’s crises and those that in future 
may generate population movements, they range from vari-
ous forms of violence, human rights violations, acute and 
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slow onset natural disasters to political instability, epidem-
ics/pandemics, nuclear and industrial accidents, and others. 
Increasingly, they are intertwined and mutually reinforcing. 
Some have suggested new terminology, such as the concept 
of “crisis migration”.19 Th is is thought-provoking but at the 
same time I wonder whether such a concept does justice to 
particularly acute humanitarian situations, the forced dis-
placement angle, the underlying legal and protection frame-
work for people who are forcibly displaced or the indivis-
ibility of human rights.
A stark example of the magnitude of today’s displace-
ment challenges is evident in the scenarios that developed 
as a result of the confl ict in Libya last year. Tunisia and 
Egypt bore the brunt of these displacement challenges, hav-
ing to cope with over a million people departing Libya. Th e 
vast majority of them were migrant workers forced to leave 
Libya because of the confl ict but who could be assisted to 
return home. But there were also well over 100,000 Libyans 
who sought safety in both neighbouring countries, as well 
as some 6,000 refugees, primarily from Eritrea and Somalia, 
who were stranded at the borders in Tunisia and Egypt. In 
response, and developing an innovative operational model, 
IOM and UNHCR launched a massive humanitarian evacu-
ation programme for third country nationals who wanted 
help to get back to their respective countries of origin in 
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, in an eff ort 
to demonstrate solidarity with Tunisia and Egypt within a 
context of international cooperation, UNHCR set in train a 
Global Resettlement Initiative for refugees stranded at the 
border, as well as a programme supporting host families. In 
this crisis, migrant workers were the single largest category 
of people who were displaced. Th is is raising interesting 
questions regarding a gap in the international legal system—
how to protect migrants who are “trapped” or “displaced” 
by armed confl ict and other emergencies?20
Importantly, these various examples point to the key 
role of the state. It is clear that the state has crucial respon-
sibilities both in terms of preventing or mitigating causes 
of displacement and when responding to them. Th ere was 
a time when commentators predicted the gradual replace-
ment of certain state functions by supranational bodies, 
be they intergovernmental, commercial or private, or by 
multinational companies. In the wake of the economic and 
fi nancial crisis, however, the central role of the state has 
again come to the fore—with full force. We need to ask our-
selves what this means in the context of forced displacement, 
humanitarian action and protection. Statehood is inextric-
ably linked to providing a safe and secure environment, 
guaranteeing the functioning of eff ective institutions and 
basic services, including the safeguarding of human rights 
and the rule of law, and a capable administration. If a state 
cannot deliver or can only partially deliver its core func-
tions ‐‐ for instance, by not being able to control all its ter-
ritory, or because of weak or fragile state structures, and as 
a result is either unable or unwilling to exercise eff ectively 
its core raison d’être in part or the whole of its territory ‐‐ a 
need for international protection may arise.
International assistance and protection are oft en under-
mined by lack of humanitarian access and presence. In these 
scenarios, the resilience of communities and individuals 
and their ability to protect themselves are critical. UNHCR 
relies on grass-roots networks and implementing partners to 
deliver services in many areas, including in countries such 
as Somalia. At the height of the displacement of Somalis into 
Kenya in 2011 and the associated security crisis within some 
of the refugee camps in Kenya, refugees themselves played 
a signifi cant role in ensuring the continuation of delivery of 
key services in the emergency situation.
It is also interesting to observe that the  Security 
Council  consistently makes pronouncements on the need 
for humanitarian access and the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance. Th e denial to access and delivery by authorities 
or non-state actors and the consequences for aff ected popu-
lations therefore become an international concern. Th is may 
well become a major issue in the future, including from a 
forced displacement and protection perspective, especially 
when we may increasingly see government inaction, lack 
of preparedness, etc. in response to environmental haz-
ards,  natural disasters, food and water insecurity and so 
forth. We may increasingly witness  the interconnectivity 
between government action or the lack thereof [including 
due to deliberate discrimination],  changing  weather pat-
terns and their consequences,21  governance structures on 
food and water security that do not respond to addressing 
inequality,  as well as operational humanitarian responses 
to what may well be major sources of displacement in the 
future.
Again, this points to the interconnectedness of phenom-
ena, of causes of human mobility, of migration and displace-
ment, the way the state addresses them and the legal and pro-
tection underpinnings. Th e interesting feature is that it will, 
I think, engage UNHCR and the institution of asylum from 
a traditional mandate perspective. It would be interesting to 
undertake further research in this regard, including from 
the perspective of persecution and refugee law. But it is clear 
that both normative and operational protection gaps exist, 
which leads me to my last theme: governance.
Governance
Against this backdrop, it is obvious that good governance 
at all levels will be the linchpin for mastering these chal-
lenges. A lot of thought was given to global governance at 
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the beginning of the 1990s, not least in the wake of the end 
of the Cold War and the hope for a new quality of multilat-
eral engagement. But not long aft er the publication of the 
report by the Commission on Global Governance in 1995,22 
it seems the world has again been struggling to organize 
itself at diff erent levels to come to terms with the challenges 
of our inter-connected world today. It is true that progress 
has been made, for example, with the adoption of the 
Millennium Declaration and Goals,23 development of the 
“responsibility to protect” concept24 to respond to the most 
heinous crimes, such as genocide and other crimes against 
humanity, as well as a major reform of the human rights 
architecture, just to mention a few. Yet the 2005 UN report 
“In Larger Freedom” is clear about the urgency of proper 
governance:25
In a world of inter-connected threats and opportunities, it is in 
each country’s self-interest that all of them are addressed eff ect-
ively. Hence, the cause of larger freedom can only be advanced 
by broad, deep and sustained global cooperation among States… . 
Th e world needs strong and capable States, eff ective partnerships 
with civil society and the private sector, and agile and eff ective 
regional and global intergovernmental institutions to mobilize 
and coordinate collective action. Th e United Nations must be 
reshaped in ways not previously imagined, and with a boldness 
and speed not previously shown… . it is for us to decide whether 
this moment of uncertainty presages wider confl ict, deepening 
inequality and the erosion of the rule of law, or is used to renew 
institutions for peace, prosperity and human rights. Now is the 
time to act.
With the slow progress on climate change, especially 
on the urgently needed legally binding agreement to curb 
carbon gas emissions, and other major global issues, this 
appeal is even more relevant today than it was seven years 
ago. Refl ecting on multilateralism in today’s world, I have 
discerned at times a push-back against international insti-
tutions, a re-emergence of old refl exes with an over-empha-
sis on national sovereignty and statehood, a questioning of 
the role of regional human rights mechanisms, notably the 
European Court of Human Rights as well as the institutions 
of the Inter-American human rights system, and key prin-
ciples of human rights, including, in some quarters, the pro-
hibition on torture. Humanitarian work has become more 
complicated as a result, with access to aff ected populations 
recurrently blocked, and established standards, such as the 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, being chal-
lenged on occasion.
Even in the consensus world of humanitarian action and 
refugee aff airs we have seen of late a diffi  cult debate about 
the value of Executive Committee Conclusions—important 
standard-setting texts on protection issues adopted annu-
ally by UNHCR’s governing body comprising 87 states. Th e 
Executive Committee did not adopt a Conclusion last year 
and no agreement has so far been reached whether one will 
be adopted this year nor, critically, on the way forward.
In fact, what we need today, more than ever before, is a 
deep refl ection about how the world could be structured 
in terms of rules, governance and institutions to deal with 
the major global issues in an eff ective manner. As Brian 
Urquhart wrote: “What is needed now is not to abolish 
national sovereignty but to reconcile it with the demands of 
human survival and decency in the astonishingly dangerous 
world we have absentmindedly created.”26 In doing so, it is 
important to bear in mind the achievements to date.
One bright spot in this challenging international environ-
ment is, for example, the increasing role of international 
human rights mechanisms. Despite some diffi  cult starts, 
the Human Rights Council is advancing with its new mech-
anisms, such as the Universal Periodic Review, becoming 
an important tool for reaching consensual and collabora-
tive solutions. During the fi rst UPR cycle, more than 1,600 
recommendations concerning the human rights treatment 
of persons of concern to UNHCR were made to states under 
review. Th e Council has increasingly relied on inquiry 
and fact-fi nding missions. Its special sessions were used to 
examine major events and developments such as the human 
rights impact of natural disasters, the 2010 earthquake in 
Haiti, the fi nancial crisis or the food price hikes in 2008. 
Its special procedures have become authoritative sources 
of monitoring and standard-setting. Th ese positive aspects, 
however, do not hide the fact that the Council also remains 
a body where political diff erences infl uence outcomes.
Let us also not forget that it is in response to trans-
national challenges that UNHCR was established as one of 
the main global humanitarian and protection institutions 
in the wake of the Second World War. Its creation emerged 
from the experience of diff erent international refugee 
institutions that had been established in the inter-war per-
iod but, more importantly, recognized the urgency of the 
international character of protection and humanitarian 
engagement, not least in the wake of the Second World War. 
Additionally, UNHCR’s mandate for refugees and stateless 
people has been grounded in public international law, and 
in particular international treaty law. UNHCR is legally 
entitled to intercede directly on behalf of refugees and state-
less persons who would otherwise not be represented on the 
international plane. If you think this through historically, 
this is an amazing advancement over the “interference in 
domestic aff airs” doctrines of the past. Th e eff ective exer-
cise of this mandate is underpinned by the commitment 
of states to cooperate with the Offi  ce.27 Some of UNHCR’s 
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functions are also embedded in international law concepts 
more broadly, such as the surrogate function of diplo-
matic and consular protection for refugees or international 
human rights protection concepts.
In this context, it is also important to bear in mind 
that UNHCR’s involvement in internal displacement and 
mixed-migration contexts entails close partnership with 
other actors. Th e year 2012 marks the 20th anniversary 
of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Human 
Rights of Internally Displaced Persons. A lot has changed 
since then. Th e Guiding Principles were elaborated. Th e 
cluster system to respond to humanitarian crises, including 
internal displacement, has been established. More recently, 
major regional normative developments include adoption 
of the Great Lakes Protocol and the Kampala Convention. 
UNHCR has actively participated in and supported 
these developments. Th e same holds true with respect to 
UNHCR’s increasing engagement with others in addressing 
the international protection needs of those who fi nd them-
selves in mixed-migration and traffi  cking contexts, as well 
as of the stateless.
In short, the international community has created a 
vehicle that translates its international concern in the forced 
displacement and statelessness domain into a legal, institu-
tional and operational framework. On a daily basis, this 
constitutes the nuts and bolts of humanitarian action and 
protection delivery at the grass-roots level. At times this has 
meant progressive development of international law and 
standards. Th is work always requires international cooper-
ation and partnership both at the intergovernmental, gov-
ernmental and non-governmental level. Th is institutional 
setting is an important achievement of the last century, one 
that transcends narrow thinking and inwardness. It consti-
tutes the platform on which to build when we look to deal-
ing with the new challenges.
On the international rule of law front, it is encouraging 
that various initiatives addressing causes of displacement 
have been addressed through international regulatory and 
governance frameworks. For example, in relation to the buy-
ing of so-called “blood diamonds” the Kimberley Process 
Certifi cation Scheme28 was put in place. As for the selling 
of small arms, we have high expectations for the July UN 
Diplomatic Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, where we 
hope Member States will strive for a comprehensive cover-
age of an otherwise poorly regulated global trade in conven-
tional weapons.29 As these examples show, it is clear that new 
standards will continue to be needed in the future, including 
in the areas more directly of concern to UNHCR.
It is important for an agency such as ours to refl ect 
constantly about the adequacy of today’s tools and instru-
ments, not least in light of the aforementioned challenges. 
Concepts of state responsibility and international protec-
tion, as we are familiar with them today, will need to evolve 
to take into account not only the global repercussions of 
human activities but also their inter-generational impact. 
Standard-setting may well take new shapes and forms in 
the future, requiring some serious creative thinking. I’d 
like to give you fi ve examples where a discussion needs to 
be had on the progressive development of international law 
and standards.
One area that would benefi t from further refl ection 
are protection responses to both sudden- and slow-onset 
disasters, including if they lead to displacement across 
borders and are not covered by existing instruments. 
Last year’s Nansen Conference on Climate Change and 
Displacement in Oslo developed some parameters that both 
the Norwegian and Swiss Governments have undertaken 
to take further through the Nansen Initiative, which has 
been launched this year. A second area where more work is 
required is in relation to protection of migrants and refu-
gees at sea, to avoid the type of situations to which I referred 
earlier. A third area applies to regions, such as the Middle 
East and parts of Asia, where many states are not party to 
the 1951 Refugee Convention. In such contexts one could 
think of the development of regional protection regimes 
that identify the circumstances under which temporary 
protection would be activated, set out its scope, content 
and duration, while clarifying procedural and standard of 
treatment issues. A fourth area would be statelessness where 
we have recently seen a new dynamic around accessions to 
the two international statelessness instruments. Moreover, 
would there not be benefi t to codify existing ILC standards 
in respect of state succession and nationality? And fi nally, a 
proper application of the 1951 Refugee Convention needs to 
be reinvigorated to address the protection needs of people 
fl eeing armed confl ict and other situations of violence. I 
hope this gives some food for thought for important global 
governance issues in the forced displacement and stateless-
ness domain.
Conclusion
As we see increasingly, if the eff ects of some of these global 
issues are not yet being felt because they develop gradually 
and if there is no immediate crisis, then existing governance 
systems seem to delay their resolution. It is the same in the 
case of inter-generational equity and justice. But we can’t 
aff ord this. Th e increasingly complex displacement angle is 
both a visible manifestation of many of today’s global chal-
lenges, as well as a trans-boundary issue in its own right. It 
should ring alarm bells more widely and trigger the action 
required to address the core issues and to craft  eff ective gov-
ernance around them. It will, I think, not surprise you—in 
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light of all I have just said—that the next edition of the State 
of the World’s Refugees will have as its theme: “In Search of 
Solidarity”. It is the human value that is both the ingredi-
ent for holding societies together in diffi  cult times and for 
ensuring that basic human rights are respected. It is the 
human value that has inspired international cooperation 
and international law and projected a vision of our com-
mon heritage. It is also the value that will, if acted upon, 
guarantee our survival. In this spirit, I look forward to your 
contributions from this Conference.
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